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This paper explores the relationship between the level of decentralization and women's 
political participation in local politics. Using the OLS regression analysis I ask whether fiscal 
decentralization fosters more gender-balanced politics at the municipal level and whether 
the quality of public service serves as a mechanism through which the relationship works. 
The following hypotheses are tested: H(1)A higher level of decentralization is positively 
associated with the higher share of women councilors in municipal assemblies. H(2) Higher 
vulnerabilities in public services negatively affect the proportion of women in municipal 
assemblies. H(3) Decentralization has a positive effect on the quality of public service 
provision. The rationale for hypothesis testing lies in the promises of decentralization to 
bring about the efficiency of public services (through the “preference matching and 
allocative efficiency” hypothesis) and the common idea that the failure of governments to 
provide good quality public services increases gender inequalities. To test the 
abovementioned hypothesis, cross-sectional data were collected on 40 European states 
accompanied by Turkey and Israel. Findings point to the correlation between fiscal 
decentralization and women's political presence. Also, tax revenue decentralization is a 
statistically significant variable in explaining the quality of public services. However, 
evidence for public services to be a determinant of women's political empowerment in 
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     A global trend of decentralization conceptualized as the ”transfer of authority from central to 
local government” has been notably present in recent decades (OECD 2019). This type of state 
architecture is highly recommended by many influential International organizations with agenda-
setting power. There is broad agreement among these organizations on the main objectives with 
decentralization of states: 1) Improved efficiency in government service delivery; 2) Increased 
transparency of service providers; 3) increased accountability of service providers to its population 
(World Bank; IMF, UN). Hence, more and more people experience multilevel governance.  
     Accordingly, there is high interest among political science scholars concerning the effect 
decentralization has on different political, social, or economic outcomes. In a general sort of way, 
political science scholars have agreed that decentralization generates development (O’Neil, 2005; 
Faguet, 2004; Blair, 2000). Yet, whether decentralization increases women`s political advancement 
as one of United Nation`s Sustainable Development Goal (“Ensure women`s full and effective 
participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, 
economic and public life”) is largely overlooked.  
     Regarding women's political representation, the general picture is that in Croatia, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Serbia, and Slovakia women are 
currently holding offices as the heads of government or the heads of the state. In Moldova and 
Finland, both the elected president and the elected prime minister are female. Women as high 
officials is a noteworthy phenomenon and one may assume that it is an indicator of more balanced 
gender relations in a society. But a closer look reveals that among these states, only Estonia has 
reached the 30% of women's presence in sub-national assemblies. Not to mention the example 
of Georgia, headed by female president Salome Zurabishvili. Women in this state, are remarkably 
missing from both tiers of sub-national government. In terms of the average municipal 
representation, women in Georgia occupy only 8,7 % of all seats. In Croatia, the proportion of 
women among all elected representatives consists of 26,3 %, and in Slovakia 25,8%(CEMR 
2019).  
      Women's underrepresentation in sub-national legislatures is true not only for Estonia and 
Georgia. It seems to be a general trend in Europe and its neighboring states. Figure 1 presents a 




Source: Council of European Municipalities and Regions (2019) 
     This is regardless that the principle of equality between man and women was introduced already 
in 1957 in the treaty of Rome depicted in the requirement of equal pay for work of equal value. 
Also, equality between men and women presents one of the European Union founding values that 
are common for all the EU member states. This principle has a place among other core values such 
as democracy, rule of law, human dignity, human rights, and freedom.  
   However, until now, no European country has reached perfect parity (50%-50%) at the 
municipal or the regional level government, some improvement has been seen, though. In 2019, 
the average proportion of local female municipal councils (or equivalent) was around 29% 
compared to the 23,4 % in 2008 The same trend applies to women's representation at the regional 
level. The average share of women members of regional assemblies increased to represent more 
than 30 % of the total.  
     Yet, the proportion of female mayors (or equivalent) remains very low. On average, women 
account for no more than 20 % of mayors or equivalent. The same trend applies to women's 
political representation at the regional level. The proportion of women presidents of regions 
remains a great deal lower than women elected to the regional assemblies (CEMR 2019). 
     Remarkably, differences between countries concerning female political representation at all 
levels of government are significant. According to the latest data, in sub-national assemblies, the 
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share of elected women in Turkey is 10,7 % meanwhile in Iceland, at the same positions, women 
councilors take 47% of seats. The difference is significant even when comparing non-EU 
member states, with a similar political background. In post-soviet Georgia, the average share of 
women holding offices in sub-national assemblies consists of 13,4 % while in post-soviet 
Ukraine, women hold 41,7 % of all seats (CEMR 2019). Hence, there is a great need to closer 
consider factors contributing to or hindering gender balance in regional and local politics.  
The importance of gender balance at this level of government lies in the equal representation 
of both men's and women's interests. The absence of women from decision-making positions 
may lead to gender-blind policies designed only for men, in which women may stay 
marginalized. Therefore, the individual preferences of both gender must be represented so that 
public expenditure and the outcome can benefit both. Especially, when local level decisions are 
of vital importance for women. Many of the policy areas under the mandate of municipalities 
such as daycare, schools, public transport, among others shape women's everyday lives (Asian 
Development Bank 2018). Furthermore, sub-national politics can serve as a stepping stone for 
women towards national parliaments through gaining experience. The increased number of 
women in sub-national assemblies may have a “spillover” effect on national representation.  
Given that in contemporary Europe there is a gap in gender representation between national 
and municipal legislative bodies1 and the fact that decentralization, inevitably creates 
opportunities for local participation in politics, it is reasonable to explore if the representation of 
both genders is more balanced at this level in the states with a higher decentralization index. 
More detailed reasoning for the need to account for decentralization as the explanatory factor 
will be provided in the theory section. 
It follows that the main research question of the paper is whether decentralization fosters 
more gender-balanced politics at the municipal level.  
The study aims to provide a quantitative assessment concerning the relationship between 
mainstream politics, decentralization, and the government's attempt to improve equal 
participation and representation of both genders in politics. It also aims to find a mechanism 
through which this interaction may take a form. If the relationship between these variables will 
be proven, it will be an edifying piece to the arguments for decentralization and will contribute 
to the feminist literature about the most favorable state architecture for women's recruitment in 
                                                 
1  In the CEMR member states, on average, more women participate in local government than in national 
parliaments. In 2019, on average, women municipal councilors composed 29% of the government 
compared to 25.9% in the national parliaments. 
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politics. It will also provide an instrument for policymakers to act towards more gender-balanced 
politics.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefs major literature on the selected topic 
followed by justification for hypotheses to be tested. I then describe the data and method used for 
hypotheses testing. Then the results are reported. The paper ends with a discussion of findings and 
important themes for future researches. 
2.Literature Review 
Studies addressing the representation of women in national parliaments 
     Factors contributing to women's political representation at the national level have been 
extensively studied suggesting several different explanations for the variation in the share of 
women in parliaments. In general, literature on women's representation considers explanatory 
variables including institutional arrangements such as the type of electoral system or the 
presence of legislated gender quotas (Dahlerup, 2006; McAllister & Studlar 2007), 
socioeconomic variables such as the level of economic development or women labor 
participation (Iversen & Rosenbloth 2008), type of parties organizations (Fox & Lawless 
2010), the level of democracy (Tremblay 2007; Wideroth, Castillo, and Bagdasar 2017) to 
mention a few.  
 
Studies addressing the representation of women in sub-national politics 
     Few studies are focusing on factors contributing to and hindering women's representation 
in sub-national politics. Brige (2000) introduces campaigns by non-governmental 
organizations as an explanatory variable for variance in locally elected women. Sundström & 
Wängnerud (2014) in a cross-country analysis find evidence for the relationship between 
quality of government and the share of seats held by women in municipal assemblies. A more 
extensive study is provided by Sundström and Stockemer (2015). Scholars look at the 
structural and cultural variables determining variance in female representation in the regional 
tier of government. The research covers 29 European countries with 272 regions at focus. 
Among explanatory variables that scholars examine are female labor force participation, 
population density, electoral strength of radical right-wing and leftist parties, development, 
voluntary party quotas, legislative party quotas, and electoral system. Interestingly, the 
authors account even for federalism as an independent variable. Here federalism is a dummy 
variable and describes if a country is federation or not. However, the scholars didn’t find 
support for federalism to be a determinant of variation. Instead, they find that voting patterns 
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for parties, population density, women's labor force participation, and women representation 
in parliaments explain women's political representation.  
    Furthermore, numerous arguments are provided by scholars as to why there may be more 
women in municipal assemblies compared to national parliaments. Most of them focus on 
increased access local government provides for women. For instance, Norris and Lovenduski 
(1995) state that Municipal government is the most appropriate level of government for 
women in terms of better logistics. Since women have certain familial responsibilities such as 
responsibility for childcare and homemaking, they face a complex set of choices discouraging 
them to participate in politics far away from their familial demands. The local government is 
geographically closer to women's homes. Hence, women's recruitment in politics is more 
likely. Evertzen (2001) makes similar statements and adds that local level government is more 
accessible for women because the perceived masculine culture of parliament is easier to 
overcome at this level. The latter is because women are more active participants in 
neighborhood associations. Therefore, participation in municipal government may be seen as 
the extension of women's involvement in neighborhood activities which leads to acceptance 
of women as politicians. However, these arguments remain propositions and empirically are 
not tested.  
 
Studies addressing the relationship between state architecture and gender equality  
     There is extensive literature on federalism and gender. For example, Lang (2010) studies 
the relationship between federalism and women agencies and policies in Germany concluding 
that sub-national autonomy brings about losses instead of gains. To the author, this happens 
due to policies that are key for social citizenship is under the mandate of sub-national units 
leading to difficulties in following up policies. Williams (2018) with a linear regression 
analysis tests the relationship between federalism and the UN's gender inequality index. The 
scope of the study was limited to 24 of the 28 federal states2, only including the ones 
experiencing a higher gender inequality index. Findings suggest that federalism as the 
constitutional design is neither good nor bad for women in terms of gender equality in the 
constitutional design. 
 
                                                 
2 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, 
India, Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Spain, 
Switzerland, Tanzania, United Arab Emirates, United States and Venezuela 
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Regarding federalism as an explanatory variable, Gray (2006:38) pointed out that literature 
on state architecture and gender “is missing important evidence”. This “missing evidence” 
according to the author is due to focusing merely on federalized states and not considering 
decentralized, unitary states, some of which demonstrate decentralization as far-reaching as 
federations. To clarify, the main differences between the concept of federalism and 
decentralization lies in which entity (regional, provincial or central government) has the power 
to decide the level of devolved power. Sub-national governments in federal states constitute 
self-governing entities. As long as regional or provincial governments share some power and 
the constitutional law with the central government they can themselves decide over the level 
of autonomy they want to be granted (Williams 2018:493).  
     For this paper, it is not appropriate to look at federalism. The reason is that within the scope 
of this study, only five states constitute federations3. There is no consistent pattern of greater 
decentralization or women's political recruitment in these states. These states do not 
necessarily devote a high level of financial independence to local units4. Also, these states do 
not stand out as a prominent example of gender balance in sub-national politics5. To this 
background, I will be focusing on decentralization as an explanatory variable.   
     Few studies focus on decentralization as an explanatory variable. For instance, the work 
presented by Ortbals, Rincker, and Montoya (2012) explores the relationship between 
decentralization and women's political participation. Scholars are focusing on the meso-level 
institutions (between municipal and national governments) in Spain, Poland, and Italy, all of 
which introduced decentralization between the 1970s and 2000s. Women's representation in 
legislatures is explored together with the women's policy agencies and women's movement 
organizations. The comparative analysis shows that decentralization doesn’t necessarily 
ensure an increase in female participation. Instead, an increase in political representation is a 
product of gender candidate quotas and proportional electoral laws. However, findings 
suggest that feminist activism became more apparent in peripheries since decentralization, 
implying a significant potential for women.  
                                                 
3 Austria, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Germany, Switzerland 
4 Tax revenue decentralization in Belgium is 0,22, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 0,11 compared to the Czech 
Republic that is a unitary state with a 0,27 index.  
5 For example, in Germany, at the sub-national level, on average women hold only 28% of seats. Not to 
mention the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with only 18,3% female representation. Meanwhile, 
countries with the highest representation of women at the sub-national level are Iceland with 47.2 %, 




     Another interesting study focusing on decentralization in Spain and Britain is provided by 
Kenny and Verge (2012). To scholars, since political decentralization gives a rise to changes 
in party organization, it opens up new possibilities for women. As political parties are the 
main “gatekeepers” for who may be elected in the office (at least in parliamentary 
democracies), the party organization is explored as the intervening variable between 
decentralization and the adoption of gender party quota. To authors, the existence of a party 
gender quota automatically means wider female participation in politics. Findings suggests 
that the impact of the decentralization on party organization which determines if the quota 
will be adopted or not is moderate. 
     Given the fact that candidate selection is up to the political parties, this lens is 
undoubtedly useful in exploring the relationship between decentralization and women's 
political representation. But it does not mean that every analysis of decentralizing reforms 
should look at party reorganization as a pathway between decentralization and voluntary party 
quota. When voluntary adherence implies variation in compliance, one cannot confidently 
interpret voluntary party quota as widening in women's political participation, because the 
voluntary party quota is only binding for the individual parties that adopt them. Especially, we 
cannot overestimate voluntary quota's influence on representation in municipal governments. 
In conditions, where even political parties in Sweden6, reported difficulties to find qualified 
candidates at the local level (Directorate General for Internal Affaires 2011), one cannot expect 
high compliance from other states.  
There are alternative, important mechanisms through which decentralization may affect 
women's political representation. As the main objective of decentralizing reforms is to improve 
the delivery of public services, that is associated with a “welfare state” (Orloff 1996), one may 
take a closer look at how these services may affect women's political empowerment. Especially 
when a lot of empirical evidence suggest that the welfare state affects gender relations in 
varieties of ways. The common understanding of the welfare state is that it ameliorates social 
inequalities, including gender inequalities (Orloff 1996).  
2.1 Research gap 
    
     As outlined,  previous studies came to a different conclusion regarding the role federal or 
decentralized states play in women's political participation. The latter points to the need for an 
alternative approach. As we could see, the literature on the connection between state 
                                                 
6 As covered above, Sweden ranks among the highest in terms of gender representation in politics. 
Furthermore, the Sweden government proclaimed itself as a feminist government.  
 11 
architecture and women's political empowerment largely exhibits country-specific observations 
and presents empirical evidence drawn from a single case or comparative studies. Contrary to 
existing researches, I will perform quantitative data analysis across 40 countries. This enables 
to widen the analysis accounting for different electoral systems, political cultures, development 
level, and other explanatory variables which showed to be important in generating gender 
balance in politics.  
     Additionally, the research gap exists in terms of the use of public services as a hypothetical 
variable to explain the causal link between decentralization and women's political participation. 
Hence, this study will fill up these missing pieces in the research literature. 
 
3. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
3.1 Central concepts 
In this study, the relationship of main interest presents the effect decentralization has on 
women political participation hence, the following are the central concepts: 
 
Decentralization 
     Decentralization is commonly assessed on three classical dimensions. Political, 
administrative, and fiscal. Political decentralization gives sub-national authorities more power 
over policymaking. Administrative decentralization is accessed through indicators for 
freedom of local officials for recruitment, contract out their own responsibilities, and freedom 
to regulate activities, among others. However, fiscal decentralization signifies “devolution of 
fiscal powers from national to sub-national governments.” (World Bank 2020).  
    The popularity of decentralization studies has led to the increase in the creation of 
decentralization measurements. As a result, the field became complex with various overlapping 
indexes. However, all these indexes integrate fiscal variables, making fiscal dimension central 
for measuring decentralization (Baptiste et. al 2019:5-9). The rationale for focusing only on 
fiscal decentralization is that local governments' autonomy in the subnational government is 
largely determined by their financial independence. The greater the financial freedom, the 
greater the power to influence. Furthermore, fiscal dimensions of decentralization are reliable 
and easily comparable (Baptiste et. al 2019:4). For this reason, the fiscal dimension is widely 
used by scholars as a proxy for the level of decentralization (Pryor 1968, Oates,1972, 
Panizza,1999). With regards to the importance of the alternative dimensions of decentralization, 
a comparative study shows that some level of administrative and political decentralization is 
present almost in all MENA states but public services continue to suffer (Vollmann & Erlangen-
 12 
Nürnberg 2020). To authors, this happens due to the fiscal decentralization failure. When 
municipal authorities lack financial resources and heavily depend on central government 
transfers for funding of public services, competencies on the paper are not of much use for 
them.  
      At the same time, Oates (1972) argues that the fiscal dimension says little about the real 
autonomy of sub-national units because it doesn’t account for the extent to which relevant 
political decisions are under the mandate of sub-national government. To the author, power on 
spending and power on making political decisions are not the same. Stegarescu (2005) shares 
the same viewpoint by saying that ideally, indexes should include both the data on the fiscal 
variables and the data on sub-national intervention in certain policies.  
     As outlined, regarding the indicators of decentralization, the main issue for confrontation 
is the extent to which fiscal and political dimensions describe power-sharing between the 
center and periphery. I will discuss how these different indicators affect our outcome variable 
in the method part. First I need to introduce the intervening variable of the study.  
 
Women's political participation in sub-national government 
     In European states, the sub-national government consists of three tiers of legislative bodies. 
The local (municipalities), the intervening (provinces), and the regional (regions)government. 
The intervening level of government is present only in five of the countries covered in this 
paper 7 making this level inappropriate for quantitative studies. Regarding the percentage of 
women in regional government, this tier of government could be considered but I choose to 
focus on the municipal level because fiscal decentralization in unitary (the ones that are not 
federal) states apply only to the municipal government. In contrast to the regional government, 
authorities at this level have both financial and legal means to implement and enforce 
decisions. Hence, women's political participation is operationalized as the proportion of 
elected female representatives in the highest governing body of a municipality, in the 
municipal council.  
     To clarify, municipal councilors are representatives of local self-government, making all 
the major decisions that affect the vital public services. Municipal responsibilities often 
include schooling, caring services for the elderly, cultural activities, community water 
systems, public transport, local police, roads, and parking among others. For example, it is in 
                                                 
7 Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland 
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the power of municipalities to provide quality childcare so that parents can effectively 
combine paid work with childcare responsibilities (Asian Development Bank 2018).  
 
3.2 Predictions by reasoning 
 
An increased level of decentralization increases the desirability of the local legislatures 
because a higher budget and the importance of the offices hang together with the attractiveness 
of these offices. In turn, desirability may determine if women will do better or not. If we refer 
to the “glass cliff8” phenomenon, we would expect that countries with a low level of fiscal 
decentralization, experience more women in local governments, and those countries with a 
higher level of fiscal decentralization have fewer.  
     The abovementioned assumption can be challenged by the fact that decentralization is 
designed to improve public service delivery9. The quality of public services relates to the share 
of women in local politics since many of these services are women responsive (Martinez-
Vazquez et al, 2012; UN Women, 2015a) and may disproportionally benefit them.  
     To start with, the underlying philosophy for decentralization is the improvement in public 
services (Shah & Thompson 2004). Empirical evidence suggests the effectiveness of 
subnational autonomy in generating improved provision of services. Although some scholars 
focus on the conditions under which decentralization is fruitful and some argue that power-
sharing can increase corruption and coordination problems, this kind of reform tends to be 
associated with better quality of government (Fisman & Gatti 2002; Gupta & Gumber 1999; 
Heller, Harilal & Chaudhuri 2007). In a general sort of way, scholars distinguish two main 
reasons for this effect, allocative efficiency, and an increase in government accountability 
(Eaton et al., 2010).  The former is thought to be possible due to the local government's 
informational advantage over the central government. The informational advantage over the 
local preferences implies that under limited resources, the government can choose the best 
option of goods and services (Musgrave 1969; Hayek 1945). Centralized states tend to have 
“one size fits all” policies, missing the unique needs of subunits. In stark contrast, in 
decentralized states, the cost and benefits of these services are fully internalized which 
improves allocative efficiency (Oates 1979). Furthermore, fiscal decentralization is also 
expected to improve public service provision through increased accountability. The 
                                                 
8 The glass cliff refers to the tendency of political parties to put women in power during precarious 
circumstances when the chances for success are unlikely. See Ryan & Haslam (2004). 
9 As previously mentioned, the primary objective with decentralization is to adapt to local needs thereby 
improve public service delivery (IMF, World bank) 
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geographical closeness of the government to its people may put pressure on local 
representatives to search the ways for better investments fostering “productive efficiency.” 
These are some main arguments in favor of decentralization. 
     Producing and delivering better public services, in turn, may increase the number of 
women willing to participate in decision-making because women may disproportionally 
benefit from quality public services. For instance, women are thought to be disproportionally 
affected by improvements in infrastructure services because of the relationship between 
infrastructure services and how women spend their time. Given that women spend a large 
amount of time on domestic activities because of social roles attributed to them they face 
diverse needs. Infrastructure services include services that are utilized by individual 
households therefore adequate service delivery may disproportionally benefit their time use 
compared to men (Asian Development Bank 2015:3). For instance, good quality energy 
infrastructure for cooking and lighting or access to the water supply may reduce women's 
'time poverty'. In turn, with more time, women may pursue education, training, economic 
activities as a stepping stone to politics.  
     It must be emphasized that women experiencing time poverty is not exclusive to the 
developing states. Allen (2012:711) showed that women municipal councilors in England and 
Wales are more likely to stand down after one term of office compared to men. Women across 
these countries are also more likely to refer to time pressure as the reason for dropping out.  
     Indeed, there may be a mutually reinforcing relationship between the quality of public 
services and the share of women in municipal assemblies. More women in local government 
imply more policies designed to meet women's needs (Asian Development Bank 2015:6). One 
example of this relationship is suggested by Bratton and Ray (2002). Scholars find that in 
Norway, municipalities with a higher share of women councilors provide better childcare 
coverage. Hence, all the more women may seek seats in local politics.   
    Improvements in public transport may also disproportionally benefit women since women 
and men have different transport needs. To start with, women access and use public transport 
differently compared to men. According to the report published by an Asian Development 
Bank, women use to have more trips with many stops due to combining economic activities 
with other responsibilities such as picking up children and buying household goods. Hence, 
vulnerabilities in public transport increase their time pressure. Furthermore, affordable and 
accessible public transport disproportionally improves women's lives because they are the main 
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users of it. For instance, in Georgia, outside the capital city, women are less likely to obtain 
driving licenses relative to men (Asian Development Bank 2018: XII-XVI).  Hence, they are 
more likely to travel by bus and tram. It follows that improvement in public transport would 
imply uneven distribution of benefits favoring women.  
     Likewise, improvements in childcare services may improve women's reconciliation of 
family and work-life and therefore foster their income and career opportunities.  Indeed, the 
importance of providing childcare services is acknowledged in the Commission's Strategy for 
Equality between Women and Men (European Commission 2020).   
     Improvement in healthcare services may also disproportionally favor women since they 
traditionally bear the burden to take care of family members getting sick (Asian Development 
Bank 2015:11).  These are only some of the examples of how quality public services may lead 
to increased opportunities for women.  
     Besides these assumptions, in the scholarly literature, the “welfare state” is often 
conceptualized as the one providing daycare, housing, education, medical services, and other 
public services. In turn, the welfare state is associated with the elimination of gender 
inequalities (Orloff 1996). With this respect, Detrez and Peksten (2017) show that spending 
on key social welfare areas such as social security, health, and education increases both, the 
female labor force participation and the share of seats held by women in the national 
parliament.  
     In sum, women being part of gendered hierarchies in which they subordinate, with quality 
public services gain more benefits relative to men. In turn, their opportunities to participate in 
politics increases.  
      Motivational factors may also play a role in widening political participation among 
women. It is argued that local politics concern more issues of women`s direct interest as they 
are the main users of local services (Evertzen 2001; Renihart 2001). As previously mentioned 
these services traditionally include public transport, waste disposal, water, schools, electricity, 
among others. Therefore, the increase in the budget may motivate more women to bring about 
changes. In turn, the increased number of women may seek participation in decision-making.  
    To this background, I argue that bolstering the economic independence and thereby the 
influence of local governments by means of decentralization contributes to an increase in 
women's political representation at the sub-national level. Therefore, I hypothesize that H(1)A 
higher level of decentralization is positively associated with the higher share of women 
councilors in municipal assemblies. H(2) Higher vulnerabilities in public services negatively 
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affect the proportion of women in municipal assemblies. H(3) Fiscal decentralization has a 
positive effect on the quality of public services. 
The data and the method used to test these hypotheses will be presented in the following 
section.  
4. Data and Method 
4.1 Data 
The data on women's representation in local government was collected by the European 
Commission, DG Justice, and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR). 
All indicators for this variable are taken from the both the 2008 and 2019 datasets. I obtained 
the latter from the CEMR and the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). The latter 
is an autonomous body grounded by the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union. Regarding independent variable, access to data for this variable is provided only by 
OECD and IMF and cover only the fiscal dimension of decentralization. Sice OECD studies 
only its member was obtained from the International Monetary Fund's Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS) which provides information on all economies reporting to the institute. The 
year of data collection is 2018. 
     For this paper, I used standard cross-sectional, in the context of the paper cross-country 
dataset. Although the work intended to investigate the correlation of variables at the municipal 
level, both, the dependent and independent variables are averaged by geographic area to 
represent the national average. The latter also means that the state is the unit of analysis. Indeed, 
the use of aggregated data for the elected women in local councils has its advantages over the 
estimation of municipal differences. This is because the level of fiscal decentralization tends to 
be the same within state borders, while there may be differences in the proportion of women in 
municipal councils. Therefore, estimation of individual differences in representation wouldn’t 
provide us with useful information about trends and patterns of this relationship. 
     The geographical scope of the study is determined by several factors. First, the data 
availability. Many states don’t report their indicators of decentralization or women's political 
representation at all, some of them don’t report in a detailed manner. Therefore, I had to narrow 
down the study to 41 states where the CEMR has members. These are 39 European sovereign 
states but also Turkey and Israel.  See the list of states in Appendix 1. Furthermore, I accounted 
for the data available for the independent variable. It appeared that no data is available for the 
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level of fiscal decentralization in Montenegro. Therefore, I dropped the latter. The data value 
for Serbian tax revenue decentralization is taken from the 2012 year dataset. However, since 
the level of fiscal decentralization is a relatively stable variable with minor fluctuation, I did 
not consider the latter to be a problem.  One may wonder if small states with a population below 
1.5 million can provide any level of decentralization. Iceland with a population of 341.24, 
Luxemburg with a population of 625.978, Malta with a population of 441.543 (World Bank 
2020) is good cases in point. It appears that even these states are divided into municipalities. 
Iceland appears to include 72 municipalities, Luxemburg 102, Malta 68. It also appears that 
fiscal decentralization is typical even for these small states except Malta, whose fiscal 
decentralization index has always been close to zero (IMF 2018). 
     Data on the intervening variable, the quality of public service delivery is taken from the 
Fund for Peace measuring fragile states index. Data on control variables were obtained from a 
range of sources (See Appendix 1 for the names, year of data collection, and sources).  
 
4.1.1 Dependent variable  
I intended to operationalize women's political representation as a progression. In other words, 
as the increase in women's presence in municipal assemblies from 2008 to 2018 by calculating 
according to the mathematical formula (value in 2019 - value in 2008)/value in 2008*100).  
However, testing the relationship between the progression in female representation and the 
fiscal decentralization index wouldn’t generate reliable results because of the different contexts 
of each state. In fact, the widening of women's representation may be influenced by factors 
beyond the level of decentralization. For example, the case of Albania is different from the 
conditions in other states covered by this study. In 2015, the Albanian government introduced 
legislative gender quotas at all levels of government with a requirement for a minimum of 30 
% representation of each gender. Legal sanctions for non-compliance were attributed to the 
latter, implying a fine of 1000 000 Leke (IDEA 2020) (approximately 9,600 USD).  Few can 
dispute that it wouldn’t have an immediate effect on gender representation in politics. Another 
precondition that would cause non-reliable results is that many of the states, already in 2008 
were performing a relatively gender-balanced political representation in municipalities.10 The 
latter means that one cannot expect the same progression levels in these states.  
                                                 
10 In 2008, the proportion of women in local assemblies in Belgium consisted of 33%, Finland 36,7%, 
Iceland 35,9%, Latvia 42,3%; Norway 37,5%; Sweden 42,2%, Ukraine 43 %. 
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     The alternative way to capture the continuous nature of the variable is time-series analysis. 
However, in the context of this study, it would give less accurate results (For a more detailed 
discussion see method section 4.3).   
    To the abovementioned background, I considered the cross-sectional data most appropriate 
for the analysis. Instead of measuring progression, the applied year of data is 2019 (the latest), 
collected across 126953 municipalities (For details on the number of municipalities see 
Appendix 1). Values for the dependent variable represent the national average of elected 
women in local municipal assemblies. Unit of measurement is the percent of total 
representation.  
4.1.2 Independent variable 
     Regarding the level of decentralization, as I previously mentioned, it is commonly 
measured on three dimensions. Fiscal, political, and administrative. To my best knowledge, 
only the IMF and OECD provide open access to the data on decentralization. In both cases, it 
is accessed on the basis of fiscal variables. Hence, I will be focusing on the fiscal dimension 
of decentralization. Given the importance of political decentralization in the formulation of 
policy plans, the failure to account for it presents the main limitation of the study.  
     Fiscal decentralization is usually presented on four measures: revenue, tax revenue, 
expenditure, and compensation of employees. Undoubtedly, expenditure and revenue 
decentralization together form a better understanding of the level of decentralization. This is 
because expenditure and revenue are the crucial components of any kind of financial activity. 
But, unfortunately, the data for expenditure decentralization is limited to a small number of 
countries. Therefore, I operationalize the independent variable as tax revenue decentralization. 
     Values in the dataset represent the national average of municipal tax revenue share and are 
expressed in percentages, based on several indicators. These are the sum of revenues from taxes 
including tax revenues from income, profit, capital gains, payroll, workforce, property, goods 
and services, and taxes on international trade and transactions (IMF 2018). In countries covered 
in this study, the tax revenue decentralization as the local share of general government ranges 
from 0 in Malta or 1% in Estonia to 20% in Switzerland. The higher the score, the higher the 




4.1.3 Intervening variable 
The public service indicator is annually published by the Fund for Peace and measures the 
vulnerability in public services. The indicator includes the provision of public services such as 
health, education, internet, and connectivity, water and sanitation, electricity and power, 
transport infrastructure, general infrastructure, and security. Furthermore, the indicator 
considers the level to which these services comparatively serve rural versus urban populations. 
In other words, variable measures the degree to which governments failed to provide public 
services in 2019.  
     Indeed, for the EU member states, regulations for local and regional governments in terms 
of how public money can be spent are prescribed at the EU level (CEMR 2018). Nevertheless, 
the substantial differences in the vulnerability across the European states are the case. This 
variable is placed on a scale of 1 to 10 high value indicating higher vulnerability and a lower 
value indicating lower vulnerability. The data values within the EU member states vary from 
3,8 In Bulgaria to 0,7 in Finland. Outside Europe, within the geographic location of this study 
area, Turkey with 4,6 leads in failing to provide quality public services (The Fund for Peace 
2019). 
4.1.4 Control variables 
To address endogeneity concerns I teased out whether other variables are equally or more 
important determinants of female membership in local offices. The choice of the variables has 
its ground in previous observations or theories and logical reasoning. To ensure that the paper 
is based on a detailed analysis, political, legal and structural variables were taken into account. 
 
Local Level control variable 
Gender quota 
     Gender quota in politics represents the rule or regulation that demands a certain percentage 
or number of each sex to be represented in a political realm. Without going into details, two 
main types of quotas can be distinguished. Legislated gender quotas and voluntary party quotas. 
The main difference is that the former is a legal requirement for a minimum share of women 
on the candidate list. Meanwhile, a voluntary party quota implies a voluntary commitment of 
political parties to adopt gender quotas. In general, the data presented by the Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) reveals a mixed picture of gender quota 
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implementation, but half of the countries of the world have adopted one or several types of 
quota mechanism.  
     However, in Europe, gender quotas seem to be unpopular. In Western Europe, quota takes a 
form of voluntary party quota, except in Belgium and France.  The same applies in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The discourse that gender quota regulations conflict with liberal democracy 
and the principle of merit (‘let the best man (sic!) win’) is considered to be the reason behind 
this resistance. According to the recently updated data by the Institute for the Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (IDEA), of 32 countries covered by this study, only 11 introduced 
legislated quotas at the sub-national level11.  
Indeed, in the European context, states with the highest share of female representation at 
the sub-national level such as Norway or Sweden have no legislated gender quota. Yet, as the 
quota in some states is an accepted strategy to bring about changes in the old patriarchal 
structures in politics, I included legislated local level party quota as a control variable. Given 
that voluntary party quota implies variation in adherence and a closer look at each context, I 
considered it inappropriate for the quantitative study with the state as the level of analysis. 
Therefore, I excluded the latter from the analysis.  
     I obtained the data on gender quota from the IDEA that is the intergovernmental organization 
supporting democratic institutions around the world. Thereby, I created a dummy variable 
expressing the presence of a legislated gender quota at the local level.  
 
National level control variables 
Women's workforce participation  
     The argument that women's role in the labor market is an indicator of gender relations in a 
society is advanced in the literature on women and politics. (Ivertsen & Rosenbloth 2008; 
Matland 1998). To cite Matland, the more women achieve an advance in the workforce, the 
more traditional roles attributed to women as merely caregivers and housewives are outdated. 
The way women are seen in society may have a direct effect on the share of women in politics. 
It will at least increase the number of women candidates willing to run for election. When 
measuring the effect of national averages of workforce participation in Europe and women's 
participation in local politics, the variable has been shown to be significant (Wide 2006). To 
the abovementioned background, the inclusion of the variable in regression analysis is 
                                                 
11 Albania (30%), Belgium (50%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (33%), France (50%), Greece (40%), North 
Macedonia (40%), Poland (35%), Portugal (40%), Serbia (33%), Slovenia (40%), Spain (40%) 
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reasonable. The data for the variable is secondary and is obtained from the World Bank. The 
original source is International Labour Organization (ILO). The values in the data measure the 
labor force participation rate of females, of ages 15+. 
 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
Literature studying gender and corruption, to great extent agree that women are less corrupt 
than men. Women tend to perceive corruption levels as worse and more hardly tolerate 
corruption than men do (Agerberg 2014). Women are also less prone to pay bribes (Agerberg 
2014; Frank et al 2011; Chadhuri 2012). Also, the evidence from the 18 European states' local 
councils suggests that the states with a high level of corruption perform worse in terms of 
women elected (Sundström & Wängnerud 2014). One of the reasons behind this correlation is 
thought to be that women are generally more risk-averse than men. Whatever the reason is, the 
consensus among scholars is on the importance of corruption as an explanatory variable for 
women's participation in politics. The controversy remains only regarding the direction of 
causalities of these relationships.  
     However, due to the extensive scholarly attention to the relationship between the levels of 
corruption and women's political representation, the corruption perception index is included as 
a control variable.  
     A high level of corruption is expected to have a deterring impact on the proportion of female 
local councilors. The CPI index measures the level of corruption in the public sector as 
perceived by country experts and businesspeople (transparency international 2021).  
 
Proportional electoral system 
The inclusion of the proportional electoral system as a control variable departs from previous 
studies stressing that this type of electoral system creates fewer obstacles to women's political 
representation compared to the majoritarian electoral system that is considered to be inimical 
(Matland 1998; Salmond 2006; Vengroff, Nyiria, and Fugiero 2003).  
    To account for this aspect I created a dummy variable expressing a proportional electoral 
system. The data was obtained from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance that 
provides data for the most recent elections. In the states covered by this study, recent switches 
from one electoral system to another didn’t occur. 
 
The Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) 
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The level of democracy has shown to be significant in explaining variations in the number of 
women elected in politics (Sung 2003; Tremblay 2007). Indeed, a high level of democracy has 
been shown to be more important in explaining variation in representation than the state-
mandated gender quota does (Wideroth, Castillo, and Bagdasar 2017). Therefore, I included 
the level of democracy as an alternative explanatory variable in the regression.  
     I obtained data from the Varieties of Democracy Institutes '(V_Dem) database. This variable 
measures the extent to which the level of liberal democracy is achieved in its fullest sense. 
Protecting civil liberties, a strong rule of law, an independent judiciary limiting the exercise of 
executive power are some crucial components of the Liberal democracy index (LDI). Besides, 
the variable contains an electoral democracy index that considers free and fair competition 
during elections (Teorell et al., 2013). A higher LDI score indicates a higher degree of liberal 
democracy.  
 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
It has been found that the level of economic development and the share of elected women in 
politics are closely related. In one direction, empirical evidence suggests that economic 
development has a positive impact on women's participation in political and electoral processes 
(Ballington 2003; WeDo 2007). In the other direction, more women in legislators show to have 
a positive effect on the economic development of the state. The former presents the reason for 
controlling for the level of economic development.  
     Furthermore, the economic factor is also important for our intervening variable. The quality 
of government public services is highly dependent on the existing economic resources.  
     To this background, in models testing H(1) and H(3), I account for per capita GDP. The 
variable reflects economic conditions in states of interest and is used as a proxy in describing 
the level of states' economic development.  
     The indicator exhibits the sum of all goods and services produced over a year and is 
expressed in international dollars (World Bank 2020). The data on GDP is obtained from the 
World Bank (World Development Indicators).  
 
4.2 Method 
To test the correlation of main variables and the underlying mechanism (intervening variable) 
I employ Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression.  
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      When analyzing the effect of tax revenue decentralization on the share of women in 
municipal politics I employ cross-section data analysis. The reason for excluding time series 
analysis is as follows. Widening women's political representation is a global trend and I expect 
the dependent variable to change significantly from 2008 to 2019. I thereby don’t expect radical 
alteration (increase in political participation) to occur at some point12. Instead, I expect changes 
in values to occur every year. Meanwhile, for the same period, I expect hardly any change in 
the index of fiscal decentralization. Indeed, fiscal decentralization also presents a widespread 
and sustained policy trend (IMF 2020) but in contrast to improvements in gender representation, 
it doesn’t change from year to year. In many states covered in this study, the change between 
2008 and 2018 is close to zero13 indicating the permanence of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, 
I don’t consider time-series analysis to provide accurate results and hence regard cross-sectional 
analysis as appropriate. 
 The selection of time is based on the data availability. For the year of all data see Appendix 2 
      To start with, I ran a univariate analysis of all variables to check the normal distribution. It 
turned out that tax revenue decentralization, liberal democracy index, per capita GDP, and 
vulnerability in public services were not normally distributed. Only GDP significantly 
improved with log transformation which means that the variable now follows a log-normal 
distribution. Liberal democracy index and vulnerability in public services remained right-
skewed. Therefore, I kept variables in their original form. 
      To gauge the effect of fiscal decentralization on women's political representation in 
municipal assemblies, I first made a bivariate analysis of the variables and then the multivariate 
analysis. Results are presented in the next section.  
5. Results 
In this section, the results are reported for three hypotheses of the paper. I first started with 
running bivariate regression analysis between the variables of main interest as well as the 
relationship between dependent and control variables. I thereby checked Pearson's correlation 
coefficient to examine the linear association of these relationships. As reported in Table 1, in a 
bivariate regression analysis, the p-values for GDP, electoral system, the presence of gender 
quota are higher than 0.05, meaning that these relationships are statistically insignificant. It is 
                                                 
12 except when legislative quotas are introduced as was the case in Albania 
13 For example changes in percentage points from 2008 to 2018. Austria 0,06- 0,07, Irland 0,03-0,02, 
Poland 0,19-0,20. In the case of Israel, Poland and Sweden no change has been made since 2008.  
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also apparent that states with the higher liberal democracy index, higher levels of female 
participation in the labor market, and with low levels of corruption are those with higher women 
participation in municipal assemblies. As can be read from the table these relationships are 
positive meaning that the increase in each of the variables leads to the increase in the share of 
women councilors. They are also statistically significant meaning that correlations are “real” 
and didn’t occur by chance. Even the vulnerability in public services presenting the intervening 
variable is highly correlated with the dependent variable. r coefficient equals -0.4. The negative 
correlation implies that with the increase in vulnerability the share of female councilors 
decreases. In other words, quality public services are positively correlated with the percent of 
women representatives in municipal government. The correlation coefficient for fiscal 
decentralization and the proportion of women in sub-national legislative bodies is 0.65, 
indicating a moderate positive correlation. Also, the statistical significance of these 
relationships is obvious with a p-value of 0.000. To draw accurate conclusions, the next step is 
to look at multivariate regression analysis. 
Tablel 1. Correlation and statistical significance of the two-variable relationship 
               
 
    
 
     Before 
proceeding to multivariate regression analysis, it needs to be recognized that even if the 
relationship of main variables remains significant, it doesn’t necessarily indicate the existence 
of a causal mechanism. Instead, this correlation may be spurious. For instance, the statistical 
significance of the correlation between the explanatory and response variable may be due to the 
third variable. As the liberal democracy index remains significant in explaining the response 
variable, it may be the liberal democratic institutions that cause both the higher women 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variable Correlation 
coefficient 
P value 










Share of female 
councilors 
log_GDP 0,2 0,2 
Share of female 
councilors 
Labor participation 0,4 0,011 
Share of female 
councilors 
Public services -0,4 0,01 





Share of female 
councilors 
CPI 0,36 0,02 
Share of female 
councilors 
Local level gender 
quota 
0,2 0,22 
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representation and the higher level of fiscal autonomy of municipal governments. The 
correlation may also be the case due to other explanatory variables.  
      It must also be mentioned that in a multivariate regression analysis, CPI came to be a 
suppressor variable for GDP. Suppressor in a linear regression increases predictive validity of 
the affected variable (Horst 1941:431). The inclusion of CPI in regression strengthened the 
effect of GDP on women's political advancement. To see if the latter was due to the suppressive 
effect, I employed the suppression identification method proposed by Sharpe & Robertz 
(1997:47). On the basis of correlation coefficients, all necessary and sufficient conditions for 
CPI to be a suppressor were in place. Firstly, both GDP and CPI are positively correlated with 
the dependent variable, and the only one, CPI is significantly correlated. Secondly, GDP is 
weaker in predicting (r=0.2) compared to CPI (r=0.36). Thirdly, there is a significant, strong 
positive correlation between these variables (r=0.82). To this background, I consider CPI as a 
suppressor variable in relation to GDP.  Due to the statistical significance of corruption in 
explaining the dependent variable, I excluded GDP from the full model. With that, the R-
squared increased from r2=468 to present r2=0537.  
      In Table 2 results for the main hypothesis of the study are presented. The full model tests 
the relationship between the level of fiscal decentralization and the share of women councilors 
in municipal assemblies including alternative explanations. The expectation was a positive 
association of the main variables of interest. When combined control variables in a multivariate 
regression model, all other alternative explanatory variables show to be statistically 
insignificant except the presence of local legal quotas. The latter means that only two variables, 
local legal quotas and the level of fiscal decentralization explain variance in the proportion of 
women in municipal assemblies. The regression coefficient in Model (1) is 0.59. This tells us 
that the relationship between our dependent and independent variable is positive meaning that 
as the level of decentralization increases, female representation also tends to increase. Hence, 
the main hypothesis of the study is confirmed. Countries devoting higher fiscal independence 
to the sub-national governments perform better in terms of gender balance in local politics.  
     In addition, the slope coefficient allows us to quantify the magnitude of this relationship. In 
model (1), for every one-unit increase in fiscal autonomy, the share of elected women in 
municipalities increases by 59 percentages. In Model (6), when the regression coefficient of 
main variables is partial (the magnitude depends upon the other variables), the steepness of the 
angle of the regression line decreases to 46%. However, since both, the dependent and 
independent variables are expressed in percentages, with higher slope value we can say that 
every unit increase in the level of fiscal decentralization predicts a substantial improvement in 
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female political participation. The adjusted R-squared value of 0.625 indicates that the full 
model accounts for 62.5 % of the variation in the share of women in local assemblies. Even in 
the first, in the simple model, the R-squared value of 0.423 is impressive. This level of accuracy 
when I didn’t account for any of the control variables or the explanatory variables at the 
individual level indicates that tax revenue decentralization explains women's local political 
participation well.   
     It needs to be recognized that when replacing the dependent variable with the variable named 
progression, results are statistically non-significant. The variable progression expresses the 
increase of women local councilors in percentages from 2008 to 2018. The result remains 
statistically insignificant even when I drop countries with already high women representation 
(>35%) in 2008. The latter means that the model does not describe progression but the current 
state of affairs.  
     It is also worth noting that when replacing the dependent variable with the share of elected 
women in regional assemblies, here again, there was a moderate positive statistically significant 
relationship between the dependent and independent variable (r=0,44; p<0.01). Yet when 
running a multivariate regression analysis, the p-value increases so that findings are not 
statistically significant. Thus, findings apply only to the local level.  
     In addition, to mark the explanatory strength of the independent variable, I tried to control 
for the past data on the share of women councilors in municipal assemblies. Since the past is 
an important determinant of the present, it is the best control variable to measure the strength 
of the explanatory variable. However, in the full model, with the 2008 data as a control variable, 
the statistical significance of tax-revenue decentralization disappeared (See Table 5).  
Table 2. Relationship between tax revenue decentralization and elected women in municipal assemblies 























0.590*** 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.472*** 0.469*** 0.463*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
Labor 
participation 
 0.254 0.118 0.331 0.347 0.342 
  (0.15) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Liberal 
democracy index 
  7.285 7.464 7.579 7.015 
   (7.10) (6.32) (6.21) (7.03) 
Local level 
gender quota 
   7.076** 7.434** 7.536** 
    (2.19) (2.17) (2.27) 
Proportional 
electoral system 
    -3.414 -3.370 
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     (2.27) (2.31) 
CPI      0.014 
      (0.08) 
Constant 21.565*** 9.029 11.300 -1.517 0.195 0.047 
 (1.74) (7.52) (7.83) (8.03) (7.97) (8.12) 
r2 0.423 0.466 0.481 0.600 0.625 0.625 
N 40 40 40 40 40 40 
                                                                   Standard errors in parantheses 
                                                          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     Further, I proceeded to test the second hypothesis of the study. Higher levels of 
vulnerabilities in public services were expected to have a negative effect on the proportion of 
women in municipal assemblies. As presented in Table 3 Model (1) the slope for the 
relationship between vulnerability and representation is negative which is in line with our 
expectations. The higher the vulnerabilities in public services, the fewer women in municipal 
assemblies. Yet, a correlation between the main variables of interest was true only in a bivariate 
model. After adding control variables, the statistical significance of vulnerabilities in public 
services disappeared. Indeed, the local legal quotas and labor participation show to be stronger 
predictors for the inclusion of women. However, findings contradict hypothesis (2) meaning 
that when accounting for alternative explanatory variables, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between vulnerabilities in public services and the exclusion of women from locally 
elected seats. 
Table 3. Relationship between vulnerabilities in public services and the share of women in municipal 
assemblies. 






Share of  
female 
coucilors 






Public service  -2.997* -2.378 -2.754 -0.804 
 (1.11) (1.96) (1.78) (1.97) 
CPI  0.047 0.111 0.110 
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
Local level  
gender quota 
  8.216** 9.549** 
   (2.72) (2.70) 
Labor 
participation 
   0.465 
    (0.23) 
Constant 35.578*** 31.359** 25.721* -3.286 
 (2.80) (11.32) (10.41) (17.66) 
r2 0.160 0.164 0.333 0.401 
N 40 40 40 40 
                                                                           Standard errors in parantheses 
                                                               *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
In what follows, the results for the Hypotheses (3) are interpreted. In this full model, a higher 
level of fiscal decentralization was expected to have a positive effect on the reduction of public 
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service vulnerabilities. Also, here I included the alternative explanatory variables. This time, I 
chose to include variables that on the theoretical basis may affect the intervening variable. 
Thereby the model consists of three control variables. Population density, CPI, and GDP. As 
outlined in Table 4, population density is significant but loses its significance when I add CPI. 
In turn, the statistical significance of CPI lasts until I add per capita GDP. However, the level 
of decentralization was significant even when GDP was included in the model. Our finding is 
in line with empirical evidence provided in previous studies. The level of fiscal decentralization 
is correlated with the quality of public services.  The slope is negative in all the models, for all 
the variables, meaning that there is an inverse relationship between vulnerability in services 
and the explanatory variables, decentralization, population density, CPI, and GDP. The R-
squared value is impressively high, at 0.809 meaning that the full model accounts for 80.9% 
variation in the provision of public services.  Based on the results, we can confirm H(3).  
Table 4. Relationship between tax revenue decentralization and vulnerability in public services 
















-0.044* -0.053** -0.009 -0.023* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Population 
density 
 -0.004* -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CPI   -0.049*** -0.012 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Log_GDP    -0.827*** 
    (0.17) 
Constant 2.792*** 3.366*** 5.325*** 5.918*** 
 (0.28) (0.35) (0.37) (0.32) 
r2 0.134 0.256 0.676 0.807 
N 40 40 40 40 
                                                               Standard errors in parantheses 
                                                               *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
6. Regression diagnostics 
To ensure the reliability of the results, I ran regression diagnostics. Tables and graphs are 
presented at the end of the paper. To start with, I checked for the linearity assumption of 
dependent and independent variables. To graphically illustrate, I draw a scatter plot with a fitted 
line. As we can observe in Figure 2, points on the scatterplot closely resemble a fitted line 
meaning that the regression model is linear (Kellstedt & Whitten 2018).  
     Furthermore, I checked for the multicollinearity assumption. With that, we can see if the 
independent variable and control variables highly correlate with each other. If it is a case, then 
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the OLS parameters cannot be estimated (Kellstedt & Whitten 2018: 264-266). As 
demonstrated in Table 6, the VIF score for all the variables ranges from 0.16 to 0.85 indicating 
no perfect multicollinearity of the variables.  
     Further, I checked for one more OLS regression assumption, for the so-called 
homoscedasticity which is the homogeneity of variance of the residuals (Kellstedt & Whitten 
2018:208). To do so, I issued the RVF command in Stata. As illustrated in Figure 3, at reference 
line Y=0 the data is randomly dispersed around the horizontal axis without any distinct pattern. 
The latter means that linear regression is an appropriate method for the data.  
     The last step was checking for possible outliers. Georgia, Estonia, and Greece present 
outliers with Cooks's distance ranging from 0.1 to 0.3 (See Figure 4). To remove the 
disproportionate effect of the outliers I dropped all outlier observations. This resulted in an 
improved regression model. As presented in Table 7, legislated gender quotas along with the 
fiscal decentralization index are statistically significant explanations in the variance of our 
dependent variable. Interestingly, proportional electoral systems turn to be negatively 
correlated with the share of female municipal councilors, meaning that states with proportional 
electoral system perform worse in terms of gender balance in municipal government. The 
adjusted R-squared improved so that reached a value of 0.709. 
7.Discussion 
 
As covered, the statistical analysis finds support for the main hypothesis of the study. It 
showed to be true that states with a higher level of fiscal decentralization perform better in 
terms of gender-balanced politics at the municipal level. This finding is robust to alternative 
explanations. The model is further improved by excluding outliers. It is of weight to find that 
the level of fiscal decentralization plays a key role in explaining female representation in 
municipalities. Alternative explanations such as proportional electoral system, liberal 
democracy index, corruption perception index, labor participation turned out to be 
insignificant when regressed with decentralization index. Hence, this work is an important 
contribution to the existing literature on state architecture and women's political 
empowerment. It also presents an additional piece to the arguments in favor of 
decentralization reforms. However, it must be emphasized again that since tax-revenue 
decentralization does not include political or administrative decentralization indicators, the 
autonomy over policy decision-making, policymaking, and policy implementation is not 
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expressed in statistical tables. Instead, tax revenue decentralization is used as a proxy to 
decentralization in general.  
     Results in hypothesis 3 suggest that there is a statistically significant relationship between 
decentralization and the quality of public services. Indeed, the inclusion of GDP and CPI as 
alternative explanatory variables in this model was challenging for the statistical significance 
of fiscal decentralization. When adequate economic resources are missing, the local 
government may not be able to provide promised benefits with decentralization (Bardhan & 
Mookherdjee 2006). Likewise, corruption in public expenditure constraints the delivery of 
public services (Mishra 2019). Even with the inclusion of these variables, fiscal decentralization 
remained statistically significant. However, the positive effect of decentralization on the 
improvements in public services is not a discovery. This relationship is broadly confirmed in 
the literature. Hence, findings in this paper contribute to the broader literature in terms of 
geographical focus.  
     In contrast to the first and third hypotheses, the second hypothesis of the study is not 
confirmed. The relationship between vulnerabilities in public services and the share of women 
in municipal assemblies is not statistically significant. 
     As the quality of public services shows no effect on women's inclusion in municipal 
government the relationship between decentralization and representation may take place due 
to other factors. As mentioned in a literature review, scholars argue that local politics is the 
most favorable tier of government for women due to better logistics, acceptance, and 
motivational factors to mention a few. However, Local governments are entrusted with 
providing a wide range of public services. Some of them are more gender-responsive than 
others. Since in a bivariate model there is a statistically significant relationship between the 
quality of public services and the percentage of women in municipal governments. It is worth 
delving deeper to see if a narrower definition of public services is significant in explaining 
women's recruitment even in a multivariate model. Instead of focusing on public services in 
general it would be insightful to focus on services that meet women's needs. Furthermore, 
measures for vulnerabilities in public services are nationally representative but there might be 
significant differences in vulnerabilities in urban versus rural areas and provinces. Ideally, 
future works should focus on the municipal indicator for the presence or absence of public 
services. 
     The findings of this study are representative of 39 states. Only two states located outside 
Europe are included. The latter may question the generalizability of findings because, from a 
global perspective, states in Europe are homogenous in terms of values, culture, liberal 
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democratic institutions, economic, and government performance. Hence one could argue that 
results only apply to the European context.  However, the worst European states are not better 
performing than the best states in other parts of the world.14  
     Regarding the direction of causality in this relationship, I can hardly believe that councilors 
at the local level rather than the national level politicians can influence the level of fiscal 
decentralization granted to subnational units.  At the same time, there are no theoretical reasons 
to believe that the opposite direction may be the case. 
     The main constraint of the study was data availability. Ideally, the study should cover some 
more states outside Europe. But such data on the percentage of locally elected women are not 
available for other states. At least to my knowledge.  
     One more limitation is concerning the independent variable of the study. As previously 
described the ideal way of measuring decentralization is the combination of political and fiscal. 
But due to data availability, I accounted only for tax revenue decentralization. Therefore, we 
need to be cautious to draw conclusions. It is not the increase in decentralization that correlates 
with the advancement of women in municipal politics. But it is tax revenue decentralization, as 
one of the crucial dimensions of fiscal decentralization. It should be emphasized, however, that 
data reliability can be questioned. While the data is extensive and standardize, it is self-reported 
and comes from the statistical authorities of countries which may not be precise in terms of 
accuracy. Furthermore, standardization of the data implies a less accurate account for details 
(IMF 2020). Missing values present one more significant limitation.  
8.Conclusion 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on women's political representation in several ways. I 
found that states devoting higher fiscal independence to sub-national units are the ones with 
the highest women participation in municipal assemblies. Hence, High levels of tax revenue 
decentralization indicate favorable conditions for women's recruitment in politics.  This study 
also showed that legislated gender quota forms wider women representation in the municipal 
governments. The latter is a piece of additional empirical evidence to the literature exploring 
the effects of gender quota. Likewise, the link between tax revenue decentralization and 
improvement in public services is confirmed. However, quality public services show to be 
                                                 
14 For example, the tax revenue decentralization index in Japan (0,39) is far better than in Bulgaria (0,04). 
Or the liberal democracy index in Tunisia is way higher (0,64) than in Bulgaria 0,467. 
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statistically insignificant in explaining representation variance. It may be due to a broad 
definition of it. Perhaps, not all interventions in public services produce greater equality 
among citizens. The alternative way is to look at the infrastructure services as one of the 
women responsive policies. As I already mentioned, the quality infrastructure services may 
serve as a gender transformative mechanism. An extension of this paper could include 
narrowed definition of public services as a causal pathway from decentralization to women's 
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Appendices, tables and figures 
Appendix 1 
Country                                   number of municipalities (cities,         number of regions 
                                                 councils and municipal districts)         
                                                 
Albania  61 12 
Austria 2,096 9 
Belgium 589 3 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 145 10 
Bulgaria 265  
Croatia 555 21 
Cyprus 380  
Czech Republic 6,258 14 
Denmark 98 5 
Estonia 265  
Finland 311 19 
France 36,658 13 
Georgia 64  
Germany 11,042 16 
Greece 332 13 
Hungary 3,178 19(provinces) 
Iceland 72  
Ireland 131 3 
Israel 257  
Italy 7,954 20 
Latvia 119 5 
Lithuania 60  
Luxembourg 102  
 Malta 68  
Moldova 898 35 
Netherlands 390 12 
 North Macedonia 81  
 Norway 422 18 
 Poland 2,477 16 
Portugal 3,400 2 
Romania 3,188 41 
 Serbia 174 2 
 Slovakia 2,980 8 
 Slovenia 212  
Spain 8,176 19 
Sweden 290 21 
 Switzerland 2,212 26 
Turkey 19,725  







Variable Source Year of 
data 
Tax revenue decentralization IMF 2018 
Locally elected women EIGE, CEMR 2019 
Public services The Fund for Peace 2019 
Electoral system Institute for Democracy and Electoral Law 2020 
Local level legislated quota Institute for Democracy and Electoral Law 2019 
Labor force participation World Bank (original source ILO) 2019 
Liberal democracy index V-Dem 2019 
Population density World Bank 2019 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 mun_council mun_council mun_council mun_council mun_council mun_council 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
percentage 0.590*** 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.209 0.213 0.215 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
labor_part  0.254 0.118 -0.001 0.001 0.004 
  (0.15) (0.20) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) 
lib_dem   7.285 1.718 1.793 1.982 
   (7.10) (5.45) (5.53) (6.29) 
muncoun_2008    0.592*** 0.586*** 0.585*** 
    (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
elect_system==     1.0000     -0.540 -0.562 
     (2.01) (2.06) 
CPI_2019      -0.004 
      (0.07) 
Constant 21.565*** 9.029 11.300 11.158 11.533 11.526 
 (1.74) (7.52) (7.83) (5.90) (6.14) (6.23) 
r2 0.423 0.466 0.481 0.714 0.714 0.714 





















Table 7 multivariate regression table without outliers 




















 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Tax-revenue 
decentralization 
0.575*** 0.510*** 0.507*** 0.441*** 0.438*** 0.419*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
Labor participation  0.254 0.142 0.320 0.377* 0.342 
  (0.15) (0.21) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) 
Liberal democracy 
index 
  5.755 7.776 6.358 2.506 
   (7.37) (6.29) (5.86) (7.26) 
Local legal quotas    7.677*** 8.004*** 8.623*** 
    (2.08) (1.93) (2.06) 
Proportional electoral 
system 
    -5.261* -5.131* 
     (2.10) (2.11) 
CPI_2019      0.080 
      (0.09) 
Constant 22.090*** 9.694 11.761 -0.511 1.665 1.115 
 (1.80) (7.37) (7.87) (7.48) (6.98) (7.03) 
r2 0.432 0.478 0.488 0.640 0.701 0.709 
N 37 37 37 37 37 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
